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LIST OF INTERESTED NON-PARTIES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1)(B), the following parties to the trial court were 
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*Although Appellant has not named the Estate or Trust as parties, they are  
appropriate appellees and Wende Throne responds to Appellant’s brief in her role 
as Special Administrator and Trustee.  
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Section 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
INTRODUCTION 
 The probate of Homer Engle’s will on November 23, 2010 resulted in 
immediate and rampant litigation.  The litigation has largely been driven by 
Kathy Engle and Judy Engle—Homer Engle’s two disinherited daughters—and 
their relentless meritless attacks on Wende Throne that the trial court has 
consistently found to lack credibility.  In 2013, the parties entered into a global 
settlement agreement to resolve issues and release all claims against each other.  
Despite that agreement, the litigation and the meritless allegations against 
-2- 
Wende Throne continued.  The trial court finally closed the estate in April 2018, 
and in doing so found Kathy’s objection to the petition to close the estate was 
untimely. It also once again found that allegations raised by Kathy, Judy and Roy 
Engle against Wende Throne lacked credibility, and some of those allegations 
were barred by the settlement agreement.    
Kathy Engle’s brief does not acknowledge that the trial court has 
consistently found the allegations against Wende Throne lacked credibility.  She 
also ignores that in signing the settlement agreement she agreed to waive all 
claims against Wende Throne.  Instead, it is a thinly-veiled continuation of more 
than eight years of litigation in which the parties have persistently and viciously 
attacked Wende in her attempts to administer the estate, which has resulted in 
hundreds of thousands of dollars of attorney fees.  For that reason, Appellant’s 
brief should be stricken and her appeal dismissed.  
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Should this Court entertain Kathy Engle’s various inadequately 
briefed arguments, particularly where her brief misrepresents key facts, ignores 
the trial court’s rulings that the claims raised lack credibility or are barred by the 
settlement agreement?    
Standard of Review. This Court may strike or disregard briefs that contain 
“burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial, or scandalous matters” and may assess 
appropriate sanctions, including attorney fees.  Utah R. App. P. 24(i). 
-3- 
2. Should this Court reverse the trial court’s finding that Kathy Engle’s 
late-filed objection to the estate closing was untimely where Kathy makes no 
argument that the trial court exceeded its broad discretion, let along plainly 
erred? 
Standard of Review. A trial court’s determination that a filing is untimely 
is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  See Gonzalez v. State, 2015 UT 10, ¶ 21, 345 
P.3d 1168.  This Court will not review an unpreserved claim absent a showing of 
plain error or extraordinary circumstances. See Jacob v. Bezzant, 2009 UT 37, ¶ 
34, 212 P.3d 535. 
3. Should this Court reverse the trial court’s finding that the various 
allegations against Wende raised over the years of litigation all lack credibility or 
are barred by the settlement where Kathy’s unpreserved argument claim fails to 
acknowledge the trial court’s rulings, let alone marshal the ample evidence that 
supports them? 
Standard of Review.  This court will not set aside a trial court’s factual 
findings “unless clearly erroneous,” giving “due regard to the trial court’s 
opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Shuman v. Shuman, 2017 
UT App 192, ¶ 3, 406 P.3d 258 (citation omitted).  This Court will not review an 
unpreserved claim absent a showing of plain error or extraordinary 
circumstances. See Jacob, 2009 UT 37, ¶ 34. 
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3. Should this Court review Kathy’s other various unpreserved claims 
related to the trial court’s award of attorney fees and its lack of jurisdiction to 
order the release of certain liens? 
Standard of Review.  This Court will not review an unpreserved claim 
absent a showing of plain error or extraordinary circumstances. See Jacob, 2009 
UT 37, ¶ 34. 
4. Should this Court awarded Wende her attorney fees and costs on 
appeal where Kathy Engle’s brief is frivolous or for delay, and where the trial 
court awarded fees to be paid from the estate pursuant to statute? 
Standard of Review.  This Court “shall award just damages” if it 
determines an appeal is either frivolous or for delay.”  Utah R. App. P. 33(a); 
accord Id. R. 24(i).  In addition, a statutory award of fees is appropriate pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
 The following statutes and rules are reproduced in Addendum A:  
 Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-718; 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719; 
Utah R. App. P. 24; 
Utah R. App. P. 33. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Disposition. 
Kathy appeals from the trial court’s April 12, 2107 Order Closing Probate 
Based on Court’s Findings, Conclusions, and Order Filed on April 7, 2017.  
R8420-8423.  On May 8, 2017, Kathy filed a notice of appeal.  R8429-8431.  No 
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other party appealed.  See generally Record Index.  The trial court thereafter on 
October 3, 2017, entered Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in 
response to a Rule 60(b) motion by former counsel, R10697-713.  On November 
2, 2017, the trial court entered an Amended Order Closing Probate Dated as of 
April 12, 2017 nunc pro tunc, R15443-460. Kathy did not file an amended or new 
notice of appeal.1  See Record Index.  As a result, this Court ruled on February 12, 
2018 that this “appeal is limited solely to the issues and record existing at the 
time the April 12, 2017 order was entered.”  
B. Relevant Facts. 
Homer Engle died on November 21, 2010.  R11442.  Homer Engle’s Last 
Will and Testament (the “Will”) specifically disinherited his two daughters, Kathy 
Engle and Judy Engle.  R11448, 11453. It also specifically disinherited Roy Engle 
and disavowed any blood relationship to him.  R11448.  The Will directed that all 
of Homer Engle’s estate be distributed to the Homer Engle 2010 Trust (the 
“Trust”), which Homer Engle amended and restated concurrently with the 
signing of his Will.  R11449, 11452, 11812.   The Trust named Homer Engle’s 
granddaughter Wende Throne as the successor trustee, and as with the Will, the 
Trust specifically disinherited Judy Engle, Kathy Engle, and Roy Engle.  R11813.   
Homer Engle named Wende as the beneficiary of 50 percent of the residue of his 
                                               
1 On October 31, 2018, this Court summarily dismissed a separate appeal by 
Kathy of the trial court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion she filed April 16 2018 to 
set aside the final order closing probate.  See docket; Case No. 20180647. 
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Trust estate, with the other 50 percent to be divided by Wende’s two daughters, 
Alexa McCail Thayer and Britta Lynn Wilcken.  R11828.   
C. Relevant Procedural History. 
When he died, Homer Engle claimed ownership, individually or via the 
Trust, of the following properties listed in his Will: the State Street property, the  
Woods Cross property, the Chesterfield property (referred to by the parties as 
the Crystal Avenue property), the Spring Lake property (referred to by the 
parties as the Payson property), the Price property, the listed the following 
properties in his Will: Estate and/or Trust are referred to by the parties as the 
Cherokee Lane property, the Payson property, the Price property, the Provo 
Property (referred to by the parties as the Cherokee Lane property), and Hi-
Country Estates Lots 123, 124, and 130.2 R11449.   
On November 23, 2010, shortly after Homer Engle died, Wende filed a 
petition for formal probate of his Will in the Third District Court for Salt Lake 
County.  R11442-89.  Concurrently therewith, Wende filed an application for 
emergency appointment of special administrator and for temporary restraining 
orders to prevent Kathy, Judy, and Roy from entering or otherwise interfering 
with the Estate and Trust properties, and to keep them away from herself, her 
family, and her own property.  R11490-97.  The application asserted that the 
                                               
2 The legal descriptions for these properties are included as attachments to the 
settlement agreement (Addendum B) and the April 6, 2017 Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order (Addendum D). 
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restraining orders were necessary due to “ongoing hostilities” among the 
decedent and Judy, Roy, and Kathy, to protect the Estate/Trust assets as well as 
Wende’s own person, family, and property.  R11493-497.  The trial court 
appointed Wende as special administrator and entered the temporary 
restraining orders, and later granted a preliminary injunction.  R2-4; R11509-
1526; R11704-711.   
Kathy’s, Judy’s, and Roy’s challenges.  Kathy, Judy and Roy each 
initiated challenges to Homer Engle’s disinheritance of them and to Wende’s 
appointment.  The each also and filed multiple creditor’s claims on their own 
behalf and on behalf of multiple business entities, claiming actual or equitable 
interests in the Trust/Estate real and personal property. R1156-57, R11565, 
R11719-11797, R11906-11909.  Roy, apparently seeking to prove that he was in 
fact Homer Engle’s son, also sought a court order allowing him to obtain a DNA 
sample from the Decedent.  R11527-34.  Judy and Kathy also asserted equitable 
interests in one or more estate properties based primarily on purported business 
interests. See, e.g., R1156-57; R11565.   For example, Kathy Engle claimed an 
actual ownership interest in Hi-Country Lots 123, 124, 130.  R11752.  Although 
their purported interests in the properties are primarily through entities, Kathy 
has been pro se throughout the course of the proceedings, see, e.g., R11752 
(Kathy Engle’s pro se creditor claim on behalf of various entities); R13509-13066 
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(motion to strike Kathy Engle’s pro se filing).3  Judy and Roy have been pro se 
since May 24, 2014, when their attorney, Isaac Paxman, at least in part because 
they had already been filing pro se.  R484-486.  Isaac Paxman continued to 
represent Judy’s and/or Roy’s entities until June 29, 2017.  R9105-108.   
Other Estate Creditors. The estate had several creditors with liens or 
mortgages recorded against the various real properties. See, e.g., R11719-720; 
14420421.  Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association Phase II (“Hi-
Country”) was a judgment creditor of the Estate as a result of summary 
judgment it obtained for unpaid assessment on Hi-Country Lots 123, 124, and 
130.  R8387-8388; see Third District Court; Case No. 070918272.  Hi-Country 
also had liens against Lots 123, 124, and 130, which the parties agreed would 
follow those properties.  R14222. 
Pre-settlement administration.  Because the Estate/Trust assets 
consisted almost entirely of real and personal property and because the highly 
contentious litigation made it difficult to create liquid funds, there were not 
sufficient funds to pay all the Estate’s bills, resulting in delinquent tax payments 
and/or mortgage payments.  See, e.g., R8-9, R14-15, R18-19, R21-23, Matters 
were further complicated by the fact that Judy and Kathy controlled some of the 
                                               
3 On information and belief, Isaac Paxman also briefly represented Kathy Engle, 
but that representation is not immediately clear from the record. 
 
-9- 
assets.4 R3-4; R18-19; R14223-224.  For example, the State Street property 
remained under Judy’s control. R3-4.  Homer Engle was in the process of 
evicting Judy from the State Street property when he died.  See docket; Third 
District Court Case No. 090921857.  On October 14, 2011, the trial court in the 
wrongful detainer case declined to issue a restitution order because ownership 
was being decided in the probate case, an instead ordered Judy to pay $800.00 
per month into the court’s trust. R6141-43. The court’s order noted that Wende 
“would like to lease the subject property and thus bring additional cash into the 
estate,” and that Judy, “despite her claimed right of possession, is not currently 
using the property in any way.” Id.   
Because there were no liquid funds available, on April 26, 2013, Wende 
moved for an order to sell the Cherokee Lane property to create funds to pay 
property taxes for the Payson and State Street properties, and possibly a 
mortgage on the Crystal Avenue property.  R13368.   Wende had negotiated to 
postpone a tax sale of the State Street property, which was conditioned on being 
able to pay the tax debt using proceeds from the sale of the Cherokee Lane 
property.  R13429. 
 On May 17, 2013 the trial court entered an order approving the sale of the 
Cherokee Lane property and to use the proceeds to pay property taxes and other 
                                               
4 The other parties sought to restrain Estate from liquidating or otherwise using 
the various properties, see, e.g., R11919-924 (stipulated temporary restraining 
order). 
-10- 
estate debts.  R13508-509; R30-31.  The trial court also ordered that a loan could 
be taken out to provide cash to save the properties, and that the parties were not 
to interfere with selling the property or taking out a loan. Id. However, the 
Cherokee Lane property was not sold because the parties soon thereafter reached 
a global settlement agreement, in which they agreed to sell the Payson and Price 
properties instead.  
 The Settlement.  Kathy, Judy, Roy (as individuals and members of their 
respective entities), and Wende (as an individual, special administrator of the 
Estate and trustee of the Trust) eventually reached a settlement agreement, 
which the trial court provisionally approved on September 13, 2013.   R13836; 
14216; 15405-06; 15409.  Kathy agreed the settlement was binding as of that 
date, as did Richard Gardner, then-counsel for Wende, an Isaac Paxman, then-
counsel for Roy and Judy.  R13836; R14216; R15405-06; R15409.  On November 
14, 2013, the trial court entered an order approving the form of the Settlement, 
which was attached as Exhibit A to the order.5  R14181-183; R14211-228.  The 
Court set a hearing for final approval of the settlement agreement, and sent 
notice to the Estate’s creditors, including Hi-Country.  R766-799 (Notice of 
Hearing, filed August 4, 2014).  Hi-Country did not file an objection or appear at 
either the first or second hearing to approve the settlement agreement.  R956-
                                               
5 A copy of the settlement agreement is reproduced in Addendum B.  
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961; R1116-1118.  The trial court finally approved the settlement agreement on 
December 2, 2014.  R1153-173.  The agreement’s terms included: 
 Acknowledgment that individuals and entities who were not parties 
thereto, including Hi-Country and multiple lien/mortgage holders, had potential 
interests in the real properties that were the subject of the agreement.  R14217-
14218.  
 
 Distributing the real property as follows:  Kathy was to receive a 5/6 
ownership interest in each of the three Hi-Country lots (Lot 123, Lot 124, and Lot 
130) and full ownership of the Crystal Avenue property.   R14219.  Judy was to 
receive the Cherokee Lane property, the Woods Cross property, and a 1/6 
ownership interest in each of the three Hi-Country Lots (Lot 123, Lot 124, and 
Lot 130).  R14219.  The Trust was awarded the State Street Property.  R14219.   
 
 Kathy was authorized by the settlement agreement to negotiate with 
Hi-Country for the release of “only those assessments for which the Estate itself is 
liable by virtue of the Hi-Country HOA Judgment.  All other claims or 
encumbrances relating to Hi-Country follow the property.”  R14222.  It further 
stated: “There is no warranty or obligation to deliver Hi-Country to Kathy free 
and clear of all claims whatsoever.” R14222. 
 
 Acknowledgment that significant legal fees had been incurred by 
Homer Engle before he died, and by the Estate and the parties thereafter.  
R14218-219.  This included $141,000 in attorney fees claimed by Karen Kreeck, 
and $135,000 in attorney fees as of the date of settlement claimed by Stephen 
Sloan and Richard K. Gardner of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy (now 
Fabian Van Cott).6  R14218-219.  Although Isaac Paxman did not represent the 
Estate, the parties agreed to classify his fees, which were $135,000 as of 
settlement, as Estate fees. R14218-219.   Each attorney was to receive at least 
$100,000.  R14220-221.  
 
 Prioritization of claims as follows:  Priority I, certain enumerated 
secured creditors, taxes on the State Street and Payson properties, and “$15,000 
to each of Roy, Kathy, Wende” with Kathy’s claim being increased to $20,000; 
Priority II, attorney fees owed to “Kreeck 141K, Van Cott 135K to date, Paxman, 
                                               
6 Karen Kreeck withdrew on October 16, 2012. R12784-12789. Van Cott 
represented Wende as special administrator from January 4, 2013 to February 6, 
2014. R12823; R302-306. 
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135K to date” with each attorney to receive at least $100,000; and 3) various 
unsecured creditors.  R14220-221. 
 
 The Payson and Price properties would be sold to pay costs of 
administration and certain estate creditors.  R14219.  This was a modification of 
the court’s prior order to sell the Cherokee Lane property. If neither property sold 
in time to pay “McKinley” (a secured estate creditor) by a November 30 deadline, 
then “the parties agree to take out a loan against Payson or Price.”  R14223.  
 
 The parties to the settlement agreed to accept all property “as is.” 
R14226-227. 
 
 The parties to the settlement released all claims against each other, 
and agreed to “[n]o further legal proceedings except as necessary to carry out this 
agreement.” R14226-27. 
 
Post-settlement administration.  Despite the settlement, Kathy and 
Judy continued to interfere with Wende’s estate administration.  Judy remained 
in control of part of the State Street property and Judy was assigned to sell the 
Price property.  R14223-224. On November 26, 2013, the Court approved a plan 
agreed to by Kathy, Judy, and Roy, for implementing the settlement agreement.  
R14283-292.   In part, the agreement was for Wende to market and sell the 
Payson property while also securing a loan on that property to pay expenses 
including the taxes due on the State Street property; Judy was to handle selling 
the Price property, and was also directed to take out a loan on it. R14284-285. 
The properties did not sell quickly.  As a result, on March 20, 2014, the 
trial court ordered Wende to take out a loan secured by a deed of trust on the 
State Street property for a least the amount owing in taxes, and in doing so found 
that “this loan is consistent with the provisions governing loans on page 8 of the 
September 3, 2013 settlement agreement (as reflected in the order dated 
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November 14, 2013) and is necessary and appropriate because the Payson and 
Price properties may not sell soon enough to prevent a tax sale on the State Street 
property.”  R366; R 345 (minute entry).7  Despite this order, Wende was unable 
to obtain the court-ordered loan due to interference by Kathy, Judy and Roy.  
R445-446.  As a result, on May 19, 2014, the trial court granted a temporary 
restraining order to prevent interference by Kathy, Judy, and Roy.  R445-446.  
The trial court also entered a civility order that directed: 
The parties are to cooperate and not interfere with the duties and 
responsibilities of the Special Administrator to carry out court orders 
and matters of the Estate.  The parties will not make efforts to 
prevent the Special Administrator from following through with Court 
orders.”  R731-733.   
 
At a May 21, 2015, hearing, it was proffered that the parties were now 
interfering in Wende’s effort to sell the Payson property.  The trial court ordered 
the parties to “not to interfere with the deal or communicate with the people who 
are negotiating with the broker” regarding the sale of the Payson property.  
R10810-811.  Based on the concern that the parties may be attempting to “find 
out who is making an offer” so that they could contact that party, the court 
further ordered all parties except Wende and her counsel not to contact the 
potential buyer.  R10810-811. The Payson and Price properties eventually sold for 
$254,448.00 and $70,015.00 respectively, after the trial court approve the sale of 
those properties.  R5334; R6129.    
                                               
7 Kathy did not include the transcript of the March 4, 2014 hearing in the record. 
See Record Index. 
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With regard to Payson, the trial court specifically authorized Wende to 
accept an offer to sell the Payson property for $254,448.00. R5057, R5061, 
R5336.  The trial court ruled that the offer was the most reasonable one because 
it was without conditions and was recommended by Wende’s counsel and real 
estate agent, and that no party objected to the sale at that price.  R5057, R5061, 
R5334-338.   
The Price property was sold to Kathy, Judy and Roy.  Roy’s priority I claim 
was satisfied through this purchase, and Kathy’s priority I claim was at least 
partially satisfied.  At the estate closing, Kathy was to provide evidence to support 
her assertion that $11,759.36 was still owed to her, but it is not clear from the 
record that she ever did. R6069 n.3; R6137; R10983-84 (Kathy stating that she 
did not file a written claim for any outstanding amount on her priority one claim; 
but was relying on the settlement agreement).   
Allegations against Wende lack credibility.   Throughout the years of 
litigation, Kathy and Judy have asserted numerous allegations against Wende in 
her role as special administrator and have unsuccessfully attempted to unseat her 
as special administrator.  See e.g. R11565 (Kathy alleging “Wende Throne’s 
misleading activities as estate administrator”).  The trial court has consistently 
found these allegations to lack credibility.8 
                                               
8 As stated, in the settlement agreement, Kathy, Judy and Roy agreed to waive all 
claims against Wende as of the date of settlement, September 13, 2013, therefore 
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For example, at the May 21, 2015 hearing on the sale of the Payson 
property, Judy accused Wende of breaching her duties by defaulting on a loan, 
asserting that Wende had $10,600.00 or $15,000.00 available for that to pay it.  
R10818-23.  However, as the trial court pointed out, the money Judy was 
referring to was being held in trust by the court in the wrongful detainer case, 
which meant that Wende did not have ready access to it. R10824-25.  The trial 
court reasoned that “breach” was not accurate because Wende had been 
negotiating with the original lender for an extended period of time, and because 
she did not have the funds available “to just write a check to pay off” that lender.  
R10825-826.  It would take a court order from the wrongful detainer court (Case 
No. 090921857) to free up the funds that Judy was referring to.  R10826.  The 
trial court ruled, “I do not see the special administrator as having violated her 
duty by negotiating with Capital Assets and getting a take-out loan.”  R10828.  At 
a later hearing, counsel for Wende expressed concern that a report related to the 
“strategic, systematic reduction of price to try and get a sale in place” for the 
Payson property not be distributed to Kathy, Judy and Roy because of the risk 
they would disseminate it to third parties “to the disadvantage of the estate.” 
R11250.9  
                                                                                                                                                       
the Special Administrator only addresses the trial court’s findings from after that 
date. R14226-227. 
 
9 Kathy only included a partial transcript of the February 24, 2016 hearing, and 
much of the discussion of the Payson property was omitted. R11249. 
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In August 2016, Judy Engle moved to have Wende removed as special 
administrator, alleging among other things that Wende had mismanaged and or 
stolen certain properties.  R4960. Wende responded that the allegations against 
her lacked merit.  R5185-90. In another round of similar filings at the same time, 
Kathy accused Wende of a conflict of interest, alleging among other things, that 
she had breached her duties by not making timely loan payments, and allegedly 
collecting $90,000 from rental properties but refusing to “pay any properties.” 
R5247.    
At an August 31, 2016 hearing, the trial court turned over management for 
the State Street property from Judy to Wende. R5258.  After an October 3, 2016 
evidentiary hearing, the denied the motion to remove Wende as special 
administrator because Judy “failed to meet the statutory burden necessary to 
show cause for removal of Wende Throne as the Special Administrator.”  R5494-
503; R5613-15.10 
Finally, Kathy Engle’s untimely objection to Wende’s petition to close the 
estate alleged that Wende had not conducted an appropriate accounting, had 
failed to properly account for the estate personal property, and had misused or 
mismanaged estate assets.  R7393-417.   
The trial court’s April 7, 2017 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
ruled that the prior and new allegations against Wende “lack credibility,” and 
                                               
10 Kathy did not include the transcript of the October 3, 2016 hearing in the 
record. The minute entry and resulting order are attached in Addendum C. 
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were “not well taken, and (as noted above) untimely.”  R8385.  It further ruled 
that as a party to the settlement agreement, Kathy had “waived all claims … 
arising prior to September 3, 2013.” Id. The Court made a similar ruling with 
regard to the similar allegations against Wende raised by Judy and Roy Engle. 
R8384-8385. 
On November 3, 2017, the trial court declined Kathy’s invitation to revisit 
its ruling on the matter.11 R15461-462; R17518-528. The court explained that it 
had “very carefully considered” the allegations and that is ruling was based on 
dozens of hearings, including evidentiary hearings, legal arguments, affidavits, 
and testimony.  R17520-521. “And, unfortunately, this estate has had, has just 
been full of venom and attacks on the special administrator that have just lacked 
credibility.”  R17522.  The trial court noted these attacks had been “relentless … 
claiming that she's committed all kinds of wrongdoing over the years.” R17521.  
The trial court found these “long, repeated, venomous, angry, frustrated attacks, 
repeated attacks on the special administrator....  I have found those to lack 
credibility. They just haven't stood up to the analysis of the facts.”  R17525.  The 
trial court noted that in addition to lacking credibility, the litigation “has been 
dragged out for a period of time due to animosity against the special 
administrator and attacks against the special administrator. So that's my 
finding.” R17525-526.   
                                               
11 A transcript of the entire ruling is reproduced in Addendum E.  Kathy did not 
appeal from this ruling.  See Record Index. 
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  Accountings and Estate Closing.  In April 2016, the parties filed 
various accountings with the trial court for the accounting period from January 1, 
2013 to January 31, 2016. Wende filed a balance sheet, ledger, profit and loss 
statement, and transaction details for the Estate January 1, 2013 through January 
31, 2016.  R2967-2971; R3347-350, R3749.   Kathy and Judy were able to submit 
questions about Wende’s accounting, which she answered in detail and provided 
additional documentation. R4162-287. 
 On December 15, 2016, Wende filed a petition to close the estate, and she 
filed an amended petition on December 29, 2016.  R5948-6057; R6066-6173.  
The amended petition outlined that Wende had fulfilled her duties by selling the 
Payson and Price properties, satisfying the Payson and State Street property tax 
claims, and satisfying various priority I claims. R6068-069. The petition asserted 
that Kathy’s priority I claim had been partially satisfied and Kathy was to provide 
proof of any outstanding amount.  As of the estate closing, Wende was the only 
Priority I claimant who had none of her claim satisfied, she also did not charge an 
hourly rate for her services despite her authority to do so.  The amended petition 
also sought to join the wrongful detainer action to the probate so that the funds 
held in trust could be released.  The petition sought to have those funds 
distributed to State Street.  
The remaining distributions were to be as follows: 5/6 of the Hi-Country 
properties and the Crystal Avenue property to Kathy; the Cherokee property, the 
Woods Cross property, and one-sixth of the Hi-Country properties to Judy; and 
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the State Street property, including rents held in escrow by the court in case no. 
090921857 to Wende as trustee of the Trust.  R6070.  The petition also included 
a request for fees performed by YHG for Wende in her capacity as special 
administrator.12 R6072-073.   The final accounting included a balance sheet, 
profit and loss statement, and general ledger from January 31, 2013 to December 
15, 2016.  R6166-173. 
  The trial court set a January 18, 2018 deadline for objections, which was 
extended by the parties’ stipulation to January 30, 2017. R5873, R6365.  On 
February 1, 2017, Kathy filed an untimely objection to the petition.  R7393; 
R8384.   
The Court heard the petition on February 21, 2017.13  R8107-111.  At the 
hearing, the trial court heard arguments related to the outstanding issues, 
including the Hi-Country judgment and liens, attorney fees14 and Judy’s fraud 
claim.  It specifically ruled as to claims of misconduct by Wende, “as of the time 
                                               
12 The request for fees only requested fees for YHG’s representation of Wende as 
special administrator. The trial court had previously found YHG’s legal fees from 
before June 1, 2016 to be “reasonable and payable.”  R5259, R6046, R8385-386. 
 
13 Kathy included only a partial transcript of this hearing in the record.  The 
transcript includes discussion of the Hi-Country claims, a partial discussion of 
the attorney fees (Roy Engle’s argument is omitted). R11021.  It does not include 
the first part of the hearing, or a record of a discussion of Judy’s renewed claims 
of “fraud” or the first part of the trial court’s ruling, which concluded with the 
court’s statement that “it’s just been dealt with.”  R11077, R11035-036. 
 
14 Karen Kreeck claimed $141,000.00, R10988, Van Cott claimed $224,288.83 in 
attorney fees, R418, Isaac Paxman claimed at least $273,687.65. R5464. YHG’s 
claim was supplemented and increased to $60,315.25.  R8140-8142.  YHG had 
previously been awarded $21,139.00 from the Estate. R5258. 
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of settlement, those issues were resolved and those claims were waived.”  
R10980.  During discussion of the attorney fees, Kathy affirmed that her 
“expenses as to taking care of McKinley were taken care of in the settlement of 
Price.”  R11013-014. 
On April 6, 2017, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order which found and concluded that: 
 Wende provided a complete accounting. Kathy and Judy had 
previously submitted questions to Wende that Wende answered.  R8384-8385. 
The court approved Wende’s accounting as to form and content. R8391. 
 
 The allegations against Wende from before October 2016 had been 
previously litigated and found to have been lacking in credibility.  The allegations 
from before September 2013 were waived by the settlement agreement.   The 
new allegations were untimely, not well taken and lacked credibility. R8384-385. 
 
 The trial court awarded York, Howell & Guymon (YHG) $60,315.25 
in statutory attorney fees for its representation of Wende as special 
administrator from May 8, 2014 to May 31, 2017.  R845-846; R8684; R5954-
955; R6033-048.  In awarding YHG attorney fees according to statute, the trial 
court reasoned that YHG had not been a party to settlement agreement and that 
the fees requested were reasonable.  R8386, 8389-90, 8391-92. 
 
  The remaining $10,568.33 held by the estate was to be paid to Isaac 
Paxman and Van Cott for their claims for fees.  R8390.  The trial court found 
that both Paxman and Van Cott had done work necessary to prevent waste. Id.  It 
did not award any fees to Karen Kreeck because she did not respond to the 
motion for summary judgment in the Hi-Country case. R8389, 8392. 
 
 There were not sufficient funds remaining to pay Wende her 
$15,000 Priority I claim or Kathy any amount remaining of her partially satisfied 
Priority I claim.  R6069, R8382, 8390.  
 
 Hi-Country would not receive payment from the Estate because it 
had not timely objected to the approval of the settlement agreement.  R8390-
8391, 8392.  The Court also declined to order the release of the Hi-Country liens 
from Lots 123, 124 and 130, which Kathy and Judy were to receive as tenants-in-
common because the court lacked jurisdiction to do so.  Id. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
  Kathy’s brief should be stricken in its entirety because it does not identify 
where in the record the issues she raises were preserved, fails to support her 
arguments with record evidence or analysis of pertinent case law, for the most 
part entirely ignores the trial court’s rulings, and continues more than eight years 
of persistent, meritless attack against Wende Throne in her capacity as special 
administrator.   
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER KATHY’S 
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED ARGUMENTS 
“[O]ur system is designed so that the ‘appellant must do the heavy lifting,’” 
Hampton v. Prof’l Title Servs., 2010 UT App 294, ¶ 5, 242 P.3d 796 (quoting 
State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, ¶ 21, 147 P.3d 448).   “Arguments, like gardens, 
take work, and a party who hopes to prevail on appeal should be willing to dig in 
the dirt and not expect that opposing counsel or the court will do that work for 
them.” A.S. v. R.S., 2017 UT 77, ¶ 16, 416 P.3d 465; accord State v. Roberts, 2015 
UT 24, ¶ 18, 345 P.3d 1226 (“appellants who fail to follow rule 24’s substantive 
requirements will likely fail to persuade the court of the validity of their 
position.”).  Therefore, to “permit meaningful appellate review, briefs must 
comply with the briefing requirements sufficiently to enable” the Court to 
understand “what particular errors were allegedly made, where in the record 
those errors can be found, and why, under applicable authorities, those errors are 
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material ones necessitating reversal or other relief.”  State v. Garner, 2002 UT 
App 234, ¶ 13, 52 P.3d 467 (quotation and citation omitted); accord Dahl v. Dahl, 
2015 UT 23, ¶ 141, 345 P.3d 566 (appellant has “burden of directing [the Court’s] 
attention to specific facts in the record to support her contention that the district 
court abused its discretion”).  As a result, this Court may “disregard or strike 
briefs that do not comply with rule 24’s substantive requirements.”  Roberts, 
2015 UT 24, ¶ 18; see also State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ¶ 47, 366 P.3d 884 
(“Hawkins fails to support this argument with citations to any legal authority” 
and therefore “failed to carry his burden of persuasion on appeal”); Sivulich v. 
Dep’t of Workforce Servs., 2015 UT App 101, ¶ 3, 348 P.3d 748 (declining to 
address argument that simply “reargues his position that the Board’s findings 
were wrong” without pointing to evidence);  In addition, this Court rejects 
challenges to arguments that do not address the actual basis for the trial court’s 
ruling. See iDrive Logistics LLC v. IntegraCore LLC, 2018 UT App 40, ¶ 79, 424 
P.3d 970 (“Where an appellant fails to address the basis of the district court’s 
ruling, we reject the challenge.”); Wing v. Still Standing Stable, LLC, 2016 UT 
App 229, ¶ 19, 387 P.3d 605 (same).  And, the Court has discretion to strike briefs 
that include “burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial, or scandalous matters, and the 
court may assess an appropriate sanction including attorney fees for the 
violation.” Utah R. App. P. 24(i).   
Although the Court grants pro se parties “‘every consideration that may 
reasonably be indulged,’” this does not relieve self-litigants of their burden on 
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appeal.  Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 11, 194 P.3d 903 (quoting Nelson v. 
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983)).  A party who represents herself is 
generally “‘held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified 
member of the bar.’” Id. (quoting Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1213).  The Court should 
therefore “decline to undertake the gargantuan task of sifting through the record 
in this case to make [Kathy’s] argument for her.”  See Dahl, 2015 UT 23, 345 P.3d 
566; see also Hampton, 2010 UT App 294, ¶ 5 (quoting State v. Robison, 2006 
UT 65, ¶ 21, 147 P.3d 448) (alteration in original) (“‘An appellate court that does 
the lifting for an appellant distorts [the] fundamental allocation of benefits and 
burdens.’”).    
Kathy’s brief simply does not comply with rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.  While it raises several issues, it does not provide any record citations 
to where in the record any of those issues were preserved, instead inviting the 
Court to sort through voluminous record pages to find out what, if any, issues 
Kathy raised in the trial court.  Br.Aplt. 9.  Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(B) (requiring 
“citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved”). Nor does Kathy 
clearly state the standard of review for any individual issue.  See Br.Aplt. 7-9; 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A).  Additionally, Kathy fails to adequately support her 
various arguments with record citations or relevant legal authority, instead 
making largely bald allegations while misstating the law.  Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(6) (“The statement of the case must include … citations to the record”); id. 
R. 24(a)(8) (“The argument must explain, with reasoned analysis supported by 
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citations to legal authority and the record, why the party should prevail on 
appeal.”).   
The brief largely ignores the trial court’s rulings, instead appearing to seek 
de novo review of Kathy’s various grievances against Wende, some of which arose 
after Kathy filed her notice of appeal.  It is peppered with “burdensome, 
irrelevant, immaterial, [and] scandalous matters.” See Utah R. App. P. 24(i) 
(providing sanctions, including striking or disregarding a brief, and/or other 
“appropriate sanction including attorney fees”).  For example, pages 17-19 of 
Kathy’s brief are riddled with of false and unsubstantiated claims against Wende 
while also failing to mention that the trial court consistently ruled that the 
allegations were not credible and that Wende had provided a complete 
accounting.  R8384-385.   
Finally, because Kathy failed to include in the record full transcripts of all 
the hearings, including those related to her various allegations against Wende, 
she cannot now claim that the trial court’s “finding or conclusion is unsupported 
by or is contrary to the evidence.” Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2).  If “an appellant fails 
to provide an adequate record on appeal, we presume the regularity of the 
proceedings below.” State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ¶ 13, 69 P.3d 1278. As a 
result, “[w]hen crucial matters are not included in the record, the missing 
portions are presumed to support the action of the trial court.” Id. (citing State v. 
Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988)); see also Gines v. Edwards, 2017 UT 
App 47, ¶ 21, 397 P.3d 612 (“It is well established that in the absence of a 
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transcript of a crucial proceeding, we will presume that a trial court's decision is 
reasonable, supported by the evidence, and did not constitute an abuse of 
discretion.”). Specifically, Kathy did not include a transcript of the October 3, 
2016 hearing at which the trial court heard evidence before denying a motion to 
remove Wende as special administrator, or the portion of the February 21, 2017 
transcript that dealt with allegations of “fraud.” See Record Index. 
For all of the above reasons, Kathy’s brief is so devoid of analysis that she 
leaves this Court to guess at what rulings she is even challenging.  It also 
mischaracterizes the record, entirely fails to adequately cite the record, and lacks 
supporting relevant legal authority.  Kathy therefore has not provided this Court 
with “reasoned analysis supported by citations to legal authority and the record.”  
Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(8).  Kathy has therefore entirely failed to meet her burden 
of persuasion, and this Court should exercise its discretion to “disregard or 
strike” her brief and award Wende her reasonable attorney fees incurred in 
defending against it.  See Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶ 18; Utah R. App. P. 24(i).  
II. KATHY HAS SHOWN NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE 
TRIAL COURT’S RULING THAT HER OBJECTION TO 
ESTATE CLOSING WAS UNTIMELY. 
Kathy appears to argue that the trial court “erred” when it ruled her 
objection to the estate closing was untimely.15  Br.Aplt. 6, 17, 43.  However, 
Kathy’s brief does not cite to any part of the record where Kathy preserved this 
                                               
15 Although Kathy’s brief refers to an objection to settlement, from the context, it 
appears she referring to the trial court’s ruling on her February 5, 2017 objection 
to the amended petition to close the estate.  
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argument, nor does it make even a cursory argument that the trial court exceeded 
its discretion, let alone plainly erred, in its ruling that her objection was untimely.  
See id. Instead, it simply states that this Court should “[d]irect[] the District 
Court to rule Kath[y’s] Objection’s to the Closing out of the Estate was timely.”  
Br.Aplt. at 43.  This bald assertion without any citation to supporting authority is 
not enough to meet Kathy’s burden on appeal.  See, e.g., Hawkins, 2016 UT App 
9, ¶ 47 (“Hawkins fails to support this argument with citations to any legal 
authority” and therefore “failed to carry his burden of persuasion on appeal”); 
Sivulich, 2015 UT App 101, ¶ 3 (declining to address argument that simply 
“reargues his position that the Board’s findings were wrong” without pointing to 
evidence). 
In any event, Kathy has not shown an abuse of discretion, let alone 
obvious, harmful error.  Although trial courts may extend time “for good cause” 
on motion made after time has expired “if the party failed to act because of 
excusable neglect,” Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B), they also “have broad discretion ‘to 
manage [their] docket[s] and set firm deadlines for motion practice.’” Gonzalez, 
2015 UT 10, ¶ 48 (quoting State v. Bergeson, 2010 UT App 281, ¶ 7, 241 P.3d 777) 
(alterations in original).  “Recognition of the trial court’s prerogative to manage 
its docket serves a number of beneficial interests, including promoting judicial 
efficiency and economy, creating a predictable system of advocacy, fostering 
finality in convictions, and reducing litigation expenses.”  Id.  
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As stated, Kathy filed her objection to Wende’s petition to close the estate 
on February 1, 2017—two days after the January 30, 2017 stipulated deadline. 
R5873, R6365, R7393, R8384.  The record does not reflect that Kathy requested 
an extension before or after the filing deadline.  See generally Record Index.  
Kathy’s brief does not make even a cursory argument that the trial court abused 
its discretion, let alone plainly erred, when it ruled, “Kathy’s Objection was filed 
on February 1, 2017, two days after the deadline established by the Amended 
Scheduling Order and, therefore, is untimely.”  R8384.  See, e.g., Stoddard v. 
Smith, 2001 UT 47, ¶ 25, 27 P.3d 546 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying plaintiff’s motion to extend time to file a motion for substitution of 
parties where plaintiff failed to show excusable neglect); Williams v. Dep’t of 
Corr., 2016 UT App 156, ¶ 28, 380 P.3d 340 (trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in ruling inmate’s filing was untimely where trial court noted inmate 
had “managed to timely file documents … over the course of this litigation”); 
Hatch v. Kuhn (In re Estate of Kuhn), 2008 UT App 400U, *2 (trial court did not 
exceed its discretion in striking untimely opposition to motion for summary 
judgment where appellant “made no showing of excusable neglect”).  Instead, 
Kathy cites Rule 6(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as the basis for her 
argument.  But that rule, which allows three extra days for parties to respond to 
papers served on them by mail, is inapplicable where the deadline was set by a 
stipulated court order, not the date of the service on Kathy (who was served by 
email, not mail).  See R6076; Utah R. Civ. P. 6(c). 
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Thus, because Kathy’s brief has not made even a cursory argument as to 
why the exceeded its broad discretion, let alone plainly erred, in ruling her 
objection was untimely, Kathy has not met her burden of persuasion.  See 
Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶11; Utah R. App. P. 24(i).  
III. This Court should decline to consider Kathy’s various other 
arguments because they are unpreserved. 
Kathy does not cite any specific part of the record where she preserved any 
argument, but throughout her brief states that she raised her arguments in the 
untimely objection.  See, e.g., Br.Aplt. 9, 39.  Because Kathy’s objection was not 
timely filed, it did not preserve any argument that Kathy now raises on appeal.  
Because Kathy also does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances exist, 
this Court should decline to consider any of her arguments.   
 “As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be 
raised on appeal.”  State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346.  “[T]he 
preservation rule applies to every claim, including constitutional questions, 
unless [an appellant] can demonstrate that ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist or 
‘plain error’ occurred.”16 Id. (citations omitted); accord Andersen v. Andersen, 
2015 UT App 260, ¶ 4, 361 P.3d 698 (“An appellant is required to include a 
citation to the record showing that each issue was preserved in the district 
court.); State v. Coco, 2008 UT App 128U (quoting Salt Lake County v. 
                                               
16 Plain error requires showing obvious, harmful error, i.e. that the trial court’s 
ruling is contrary to well-settled case law and that absent the error there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. See, e.g., 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶ 31, 12 P.3d 92.   
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Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1989) (“‘It is axiomatic that, before a 
party may advance an issue on appeal, the record must clearly show that it 
was timely presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling 
thereon.’”). 
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, an appellant must make 
a timely objection that provides the trial court with an adequate opportunity to 
correct any claimed errors. “An issue is preserved for appeal when it has been 
presented to the district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity 
to rule on that issue." Wolferts v. Wolferts, 2013 UT App 235, ¶ 19, 315 P.3d 448; 
accord 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801 (same).   
“To provide the court with this opportunity, the issue must be specifically raised 
[by the party asserting error], in a timely manner, and must be supported by 
evidence and relevant legal authority.” Wolferts, 2013 UT App 235, ¶ 
19 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);accord 
Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ¶ 15, 164 P.3d 366 (same); State v. Richins, 2004 
UT App 36, ¶ 8, 86 P.3d 759 (same).   
The timeliness requirement is “a pre-condition to appellate review because 
entertaining belatedly raised issues sanction[s] the practice of 
withholding  positions that should properly be presented to the trial court but 
which may be withheld for the purpose of seeking a reversal on appeal.’” State v. 
Johnson, 2013 UT App 276, ¶ 8, 316 P.3d 994 (quoting State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 
358, 361-62 (Utah App. 1993)) (alteration in original); accord Hart v. Salt Lake 
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Cty. Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (explaining the timeliness 
requirement affords the trial court “an opportunity to rule on the issue’s merits”).  
In addition, preservation requires the appellant to “state clearly and 
specifically all grounds for objection.” State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 
(Utah 1993).  Thus, even timely objections will not preserve an issue for appeal if 
they lack specificity and do not “introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority.” 438 Main St., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51.  Merely presenting evidence at trial 
that could potentially support a claim of error is not sufficient to preserve it for 
appeal.  Rather, an appellant must make a specific and timely objection to the 
trial court.  See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ¶ 45, 114 P.3d 551. 
This Court should decline to address any of the issues raised in Kathy’s 
brief because the objection that she cites to as preserving them was untimely, and 
she does not argue that any exception to the preservation rule should apply. See 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11.   
 
IV. KATHY’S UNSUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATIONS 
AGAINST WENDE ARE NOT CREDIBLE 
Kathy appears to argue that Wende breached her duties as special 
administrator by 1) not properly protecting estate property, primarily the State 
Street property (Br. Aplt. at 7, 17-18, 41); 2) using “improper accounting 
methods” (Br.Aplt. at 7, 42-43); and 3) not distributing the real properties 
pursuant to the estate closing order (Br.Aplt. at 4, 18, 41-42).  
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 These arguments ignore that the trial court has consistently found the 
parties’ allegations against Wende to lack credibility.  In its April 6, 2017 findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court specifically found and concluded 
that:  
 All parties to the settlement agreement “have released all claims 
against each other arising on or before September 3, 2013.”  
  
 All claims of wrongdoing against Wende arising on or before October 
3, 2016 “have already been litigated, found to lack credibility, and 
denied by the Court.”  
 
 Wende “has a provided a complete accounting of the Estate financial 
transactions that have occurred from January 2013 to the present.”  
 
 Kathy, Judy and Roy, were allowed to submit questions to Wende 
about the accounting, and Wende answered their questions.   
 
 As with Judy’s and Roy’s allegations, “Kathy’s current allegations of 
wrongdoing lack credibility” and “are untimely.”  
R8384-8385.  Kathy’s brief entirely fails to acknowledge those findings by the 
trial court.  As a result, this Court should decline to consider any of the  
allegations against Wende.  See iDrive Logistics LLC v. IntegraCore LLC, 2018 
UT App 40, ¶ 79, 424 P.3d 970 (“Where an appellant fails to address the basis of 
the district court’s ruling, we reject the challenge.”); accord Cattani v. Drake, 
2018 UT App 77, ¶ 52, 424 P.3d 1131 (declining to consider appellants arguments 
that were “silent as to the district court's conclusion”); Golden Meadows Props., 
LC v. Strand, 2010 UT App 257, ¶ 17, 241 P.3d 375 (appellant who “fails to attack 
the district court’s” ruling “cannot demonstrate that the district court erred”).    
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As will be shown, Kathy’s failure to acknowledge the trial court’s findings 
and the evidence supporting them is fatal to her attempt to show the trial court 
exceeded its broad discretion, let alone plainly erred in its ruling that her old and 
new allegations all lacked credibility or had been waived.   
A. Kathy has not shown that the trial court plainly erred in ruling 
her allegations against Wende lack credibility. 
Kathy’s brief is peppered with various unsupported allegations of 
wrongdoing against Wende related to her Estate accounting and managing of 
Estate properties.  See Br.Aplt. at 7, 17-18, 41-43.  Specifically, Kathy alleges that 
Wende did not provide a proper accounting of all estate assets “from the time of 
death” and should be required to do so and that she mismanaged the State Street 
property. Br.Aplt. 42-43. 
 As stated, this Court should “reject the challenge” because Kathy fails to 
acknowledge that the trial court has found her allegations to lack credibility and 
has also ruled that she waived all claims that arose before September 2013 by 
entering into the settlement agreement.  See iDrive Logistics LLC v. IntegraCore 
LLC, 2018 UT App 40, ¶ 79, 424 P.3d 970.  Kathy has also failed to provide a 
complete record of Kathy’s brief ignores the ample record evidence that supports 
the trial court’s findings that the allegations against Wende lack credibility.  She 
did not include a transcript of the October 3, 2016 hearing at which parties 
presented evidence related to those claims.  She included only a partial transcript 
of the February 24, 2016 hearing and of the February 21, 2017 hearing.  This 
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“absence of a transcript of a crucial proceeding,” means that the Court should 
“presume that [the] trial court’s decision is reasonable, supported by the 
evidence, and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.”  See Gines v. Edwards, 
2017 UT App 47, ¶ 21, 397 P.3d 612; accord State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ¶ 13, 
69 P.3d 1278 (same).  Finally, Kathy failed to appeal from the trial court’s ruling 
that it would not alter its finding that the allegations against Wende lack 
credibility, in part because the “long, repeated, venomous, angry, frustrated 
attacks, repeated attacks on the special administrator....  just haven't stood up to 
the analysis of the facts.”  R17525.    
In any event, Kathy cannot show an abuse of discretion, let alone plain 
error because she ignores the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that 
the allegations lack credibility. “When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of 
the evidence, [the Court] will not set aside a trial court's factual findings ‘unless 
clearly erroneous,’ giving ‘due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses.’”  Shuman, 2017 UT App 192, ¶3 (quoting Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a)(4)).  Kathy’s failure to marshal the evidence supporting the trial 
court’s findings “greatly undermine[s]” the persuasiveness of her argument on 
appeal.  Cf. State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶44, 326 P.3d 645 (sufficiency of 
evidence challenge).   
1. Kathy’s accounting allegations lack credibility.  
Kathy’s unpreserved arguments related to Wende’s accounting ignore the 
evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that her accounting was complete.  
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For example, while Kathy cites to her own objection to the accounting, she 
ignores that Wende has provided multiple accountings, that she was able to ask 
questions about those accountings, and that Wende answered those questions.  
R2967-971; R3347-50; R3749; R4162; R6066-173.  It further ignores that the 
trial court heard evidence on Judy’s motion to remove Wende, which included 
allegations related to accounting, and rejected it.  R5494-503; R5613-15.  Finally, 
Finally, ignoring the trial court’s ruling that Wende provided “Kathy vaguely 
asserts that Wende did not comply with GAAP and therefore a special master 
should be appointed, but she does not point to any specific part of the accounting 
that is incomplete or inaccurate, or cite any authority to support her assertion. 
Br.Aplt. 39-40, 42-43.   Moreover, Kathy ignores that the Court specifically found 
that Wende “provided a complete accounting” and approved it as to form and 
content.  R8385, 391.   
She therefore cannot meet her burden of persuasion to show that the trial 
court abused its discretion, let alone plainly erred, in approving Wende’s 
accounting rather than sua sponte appointing a special master. See, e.g., Dahl, 
2015 UT 23, ¶ 67 (appellant has “burden of directing [the Court’s] attention to 
specific facts in the record to support her contention that the district court 
abused its discretion”); Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ¶ 47 (appellant who did not 
support argument with analysis of legal authority “failed to carry his burden of 
persuasion on appeal”).   
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2. Kathy’s property management allegations lack credibility. 
Kathy further asserts that Wende breached her duties by taking out a loan 
rather than using rental proceeds to pay property taxes, primarily on the State 
Street property.  Br.Aplt. 18-19.   Kathy’s argument ignores that the trial court on 
more than one occasion ordered Kathy, Judy and Roy to not interfere with her 
estate administration.  See, e.g., R13508-509; R30-31; R10825-826.  It also 
ignores the trial court’s specific ruling that such a loan was needed because there 
were no funds available to pay the taxes. R10825-826.  It ignores that the parties’ 
settlement agreement contemplated loans, and that the court ordered that a loan 
be taken out to save the State Street property. R14223, R10833.  Kathy’s brief 
further ignores that Wende was willing to use $10,000.00 of her own personal 
funds to avoid foreclosure if needed.  R10833.   Finally, Kathy ignores that the 
trial court specifically rejected an allegation that not paying a loan was a breach 
of duty because Wende had been negotiating with the original lender for an 
extended period of time, and because the Estate did not have the funds available 
“to just write a check to pay off” that lender.  R10825-826.   
Thus, Kathy has not demonstrated that the trial court’s findings are against 
the clear weight of the evidence, let alone that the trial court plainly erred in its 
rulings.  See, e.g., Dahl, 2015 UT 23, ¶ 67; Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ¶ 47.  
As a result of the foregoing, Kathy’s arguments do not comport with rule 
24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and she cannot meet her burden of 
persuasion on appeal to show that the trial court’s finding that her allegations 
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against Wende lack credibility, let alone that the trial court’s finding was plain 
error.  See, e.g., Roberts  2015 UT 24, ¶ 18.  
B. The settlement resolved all claims among the parties that arose 
before September 3, 2013. 
Kathy’s various purported grievances that arose before the settlement 
agreement and argument that Wende should be required to provide an 
accounting “from date of death” ignores the plain language of settlement 
agreement.  Br.Aplt. 20-21, 42.  Her arguments also ignore that the trial court 
ruled that the parties’ settlement “released all claims against each other arising 
on or before September 3, 2013.” R8384.  
When a contract’s language is unambiguous, “courts ‘first look to the four 
corners of the agreement to determine the intentions of the parties . . . from the 
plain meaning of the contractual language.’” Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App 351, 
¶ 34, 121 P.3d 57 (quoting Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 
3, ¶ 12, 40 P.3d 599).  Kathy concedes that the “plain terms of the Settlement 
Agreement dictate the outcome of this appeal.”  Br.Aplt. 26.  The settlement 
unambiguously provides: “All parties would release all claims against all parties.” 
R14226.   
Kathy does not acknowledge the trial court’s ruling or challenge it.  Nor 
does she argue any ambiguity or latent ambiguity in her release of claims.  Thus, 
Kathy has not shown the trial court abused its discretion, let alone plainly erred 
in ruling that the settlement agreement “released all claims against … arising on 
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or before September 3, 2013.” R8384;  See iDrive Logistics LLC, 2018 UT App 
40, ¶ 79;  Dahl, 2015 UT 23, ¶67; Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶18.    
C. This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Kathy’s assertion that 
Wende has not complied with the estate closing order. 
 
Kathy’s brief raises various unsubstantiated arguments related to issues 
that arose after the April 12, 2017 final order from which she appeals.  For 
example, it asserts that “deed distributions were incomplete, untimely and not 
prepared according to the terms of the Settlement or the D.Court’s instructions.”  
Br.Aplt. 17.  It then asserts that there is a “pending order to show cause,” 
apparently based on Kathy’s October 19, 2017 motion for order to show cause. 
Br.Aplt. 18.   
This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider any of these arguments because 
the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the issues and the record as it stood as of the 
April 12, 2017 final order closing probate.  A timely notice of appeal is required 
to vest jurisdiction in the appellate court.  See Utah R. App. P. 4.  “A notice of 
appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but before entry of an 
order disposing of any [rule 60(b) motion] shall be treated as filed after entry of 
the order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice of appeal is effective 
to appeal only from the underlying judgment.” Id. R. 4(b)(2); accord Bowen v. 
Hart, 2012 UT App 351, ¶ 3, 294 P.3d 573 (“To bring the disposition of the rule 
59 motion within the scope of the appeal, a new or amended notice of appeal 
must be filed after the entry of the order resolving the motion.”).   
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Accordingly, to the extent Kathy’s brief asserts arguments related to issues 
that arose after the final order she appealed from, it should be stricken because 
those arguments fall outside the scope of Kathy’s appeal and this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider them.  See Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(2).  
V. KATHY’S VARIOUS OTHER CLAIMS LACK MERIT.  
Kathy also argues that this Court should reverse its award of attorney fees 
to YHG, Van Cott and Isaac Paxman and that liens held by Hi-Country and Isaac 
Paxman against certain real properties awarded to entities owned by Kathy and 
Judy should be released.17  Although Wende responds to these arguments in her 
capacity as special administrator of the Estate, she does not represent any of the 
parties whose interests would be impacted by these arguments.  Her response is 
therefore limited to the Estate’s position and to jurisdictional issues. 
As an initial matter, Wende renews her argument that this Court lacks 
jurisdiction over Kathy’s arguments related to YHG, Van Cott, Isaac Paxman, or 
Hi-Country, because Kathy did not join them as parties.  See Davis v. Mercantile 
Tr. Co., 152 U.S. 590, 593 (1894) (“[A]ll the parties to the record, who appear to 
have any interest in the order or ruling challenged, must be given an opportunity 
                                               
17 Kathy also appears to assert that the trial court should have awarded her “the 
appraised value of Coins” to be applied to her priority I claim.  Br.Aplt. 6.  
However, Kathy has provided no record citation to show where this issue was 
preserved, nor does she provide even a cursory analysis to show that it should 
have been obvious to the trial court that she was entitled to the coins or any value 
received therefrom. This Court should therefore reject any argument in that 
regard. See, e.g., Dahl, 2015 UT 23, ¶ 67; Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶ 18; Hawkins, 
2016 UT App 9, ¶ 47. 
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to be heard on such appeal.”); In re Estate of Anderson, 821 P.2d 1169, 1172 
(Utah 1991)  (quoting Tulsa Professional Collection Services Inc. v. Pope, 485 
U.S. 478 (1988); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983)) 
(“[I]f appellant’s identity as a creditor was known or ‘reasonably ascertainable,’ 
then the Due Process Clause requires that appellant be given ‘notice by mail or 
other means as certain to ensure actual notice’” for nonclaims statute to apply); 
Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah 1987) (“Courts can generally make a 
legally binding adjudication only between the parties actually joined in the 
action.”); Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-403(2)(a) (“[N]otice … shall be given to every 
interested person.”  Given that creditors are entitled to notice at other stages of 
the proceeding, requiring estate creditors to affirmatively intervene  in the appeal 
rather than placing the burden on the appellant to ensure that all interested 
parties whose rights would be impacted by the appeal are joined does not 
comport with due process. 
A. YHG was not a party to the settlement; Wende was statutorily 
entitle to her attorney fees. 
Kathy asserts that YHG’s attorney fees are unreasonable, should be 
subrogated to her own claim, and that Wende should be personally liable for 
those fees because “[a]ll attorneys agreed to Settlement” and “the parties set up 
this specific [priority 2] category for payment of all legal fees.” Br.Aplt. 31-34, 42.   
She also argues that the fees were unreasonable and some were related to 
representation of Wende personally.  Id. Br.Aplt. 31-33. In addition to generally 
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failing to cite any record evidence or authority to support this argument, Kathy’s 
brief ignores the basis for the trial court’s award of fees to YHG from the Estate—
the fees were “reasonable and appropriate,” YHG was not a party to the 
settlement and did not agree to subordinate fees, and attorney fees were a 
priority expense of administration pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-805.  
R8385-386.  Additionally, YHG had reclassified $17,211.00 in fees that were not 
payable from the Estate.  Id.  Thus, because she fails to cite any relevant evidence 
or authority, let alone acknowledge the basis for the trial court’s ruling, Kathy 
cannot meet her burden of persuasion on appeal. See iDrive Logistics LLC, 2018 
UT App 40, ¶ 79 (“Where an appellant fails to address the basis of the district 
court’s ruling, we reject the challenge.”); Dahl, 2015 UT 23, ¶ 141 (appellant has 
“burden of directing [the Court’s] attention to specific facts in the record to 
support her contention that the district court abused its discretion”). 
In any event, Kathy has not shown an abuse of discretion, let alone plain 
error because it is fundamental that “the ‘provisions of a contract’ would not 
apply to a mere party to the litigation who is unmentioned in the contract.”  
Hooban v. Unicity Int'l, Inc., 2012 UT 40, ¶ 23, 285 P.3d 766.  “Most contracts 
bind only those who bargain for them, and ‘the burden of proof for showing the 
parties’ mutual assent as to all material terms and conditions is on the party 
claiming that there is a contract.’”  Bybee v. Abdulla, 2008 UT 35, ¶ 8, 189 P.3d 
40 (citing Aquagen Int'l, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1998) and 
quoting Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 
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1995)).  Given that the settlement agreement references only the fees of Karen 
Kreeck, Van Cott, and Isaac Paxman, Kathy cannot show that the trial court 
plainly erred in ruling that YHG’s fees were not subject to the settlement. 
Nor is Kathy’s assertion that Wende should be personally liable persuasive.  
The Utah code provides that costs and expenses of administration are a priority 
claim, see Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-805.  It further provides that a “personal 
representative and an attorney are entitled to reasonable compensation for their 
services.”  Id. § 75-3-718(1).  Further, “[i]f any personal representative or person 
nominated as personal representative defends or prosecutes any proceeding in 
good faith, whether successful or not, the personal representative is entitled to 
receive from the estate all necessary expenses and disbursements, including 
reasonable attorney fees incurred.”18  Id. § 75-3-719.   
For the above Kathy’s argument that Wende should be personally liable for 
YHG’s fees associated with the Estate or that those fees should be paid after hers 
lack merit.  Br.Aplt. 34.   
B. Kathy’s arguments related to Van Cott, Paxman, and Hi-Country  
Likewise Kathy fails to acknowledge the basis for the trial court’s awards of  
fees of Paxman and Van Cott, or its ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to remove the 
                                               
18 Kathy’s brief also fails to cite any record evidence in support of her allegation 
that YHG’s representation presented a conflict of interest. Br.Aplt. 38.  The 
record does not support this accusation, particularly where Wende was not 
reimbursed for YHG’s representation of her as an individual.  R4595, 8386.  
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Hi Country and Paxman liens.  See generally Br.Aplt. 29-35.  She also fails to 
identify where in the record she preserved her arguments in that regard.  This 
Court should therefore decline to consider those arguments.  See, e.g., Roberts, 
2015 UT 24, ¶ 18 (the Court may “disregard or strike briefs that do not comply 
with rule 24’s substantive requirements”).   
 In any event, even if Kathy could show plain error, the remedy would not 
be to pay Kathy’s priority one claim in full.  It would be to remand to the trial 
court to determine a fair redistribution of the funds pro-rata among Kathy, 
Wende, and Roy.  See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-902(2) (“Abatement within 
each classification is in proportion to the amounts of property each of the 
beneficiaries would have received if full distribution of the property had been 
made in accordance with the terms of the will.”).  As stated, Wende is the only 
party to the settlement with a priority I claim who has received no payment, and 
as stated she has not taken payment from the Estate for her time. As a result, 
Kathy’s requested relief is not only not allowed under the law, it would be 
manifestly unjust. 
 Finally, to the extent Kathy argues that the trial court should have removed 
the Hi-Country and Isaac Paxman liens so that she could receive quiet title, her 
brief ignores that the trial court specifically ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to do 
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so.19   Br.Aplt. 27, 29-30.  In addition, Kathy has no standing to challenge the 
Paxman lien against the Cherokee Lane property because she has no legal interest 
in that property. And, because Kathy’s entities, not Kathy individually, own the 
Hi-Country lots, she is not a proper party to challenge the Hi-Country liens.  See, 
e.g., Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ¶50, 123 P.3d 416 (“To satisfy the ‘basic 
requirements’ of the traditional standing test, ‘a party must allege that he or she 
has suffered or will imminently suffer an injury that is fairly traceable to the 
conduct at issue such that a favorable decision is likely to redress the injury.’”) 
(quoting Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, ¶ 9, 86 P.3d 735; Packer v. 
National Service Indus., Inc., 909 P.2d 1277, 1278 (Utah App. 1996) 
(codefendant in a multiparty litigation could not oppose a summary judgment 
motion between other parties where no cross-claim had been brought).  
Moreover, Kathy claimed actual ownership of the Hi-Country lots in at 
least one creditor’s claim.  R11752.  And the settlement agreement specifically 
stated there “is no warranty or obligation to deliver Hi-Country to Kathy free and 
clear of all claims” and stated the “claims or encumbrances relating to Hi-
Country follow the property.” R14222.  Thus, because Hi-Country did not appeal 
the trial court’s ruling that the Estate was not liable to pay its judgment and 
because Kathy agreed to be otherwise bound, she cannot show that the trial court 
                                               
19  To the extent Kathy argues the settlement granted jurisdiction, 
“‘acquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the 
court.’” First Nat'l Bank of Layton v. Palmer, 2018 UT 43, ¶ 6, 427 P.3d 1169 
(quoting A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991)).  
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plainly erred.  Likewise, because Judy did not appeal, Kathy cannot show the trial 
court plainly erred in declining to remove the lien Judy agreed to from the 
Cherokee Lane property. 
VI. This Court should award Wende her attorney fees and 
costs on appeal.  
A. Wende is entitled to attorney fees because Kathy’s brief is 
frivolous and for delay. 
This Court should award Wende her attorney fees under Rules 24(i) or 
33(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.  This Court may “strike or disregard a 
brief that contains burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial, or scandalous matters, 
and the court may assess an appropriate sanction including attorney fees for the 
violation.”  Utah R. App. P. 24(i).  As stated, Kathy’s brief is riddled with false and 
scandalous matters, fails to even acknowledge the trial court’s rulings, let alone 
explain how they were an abuse of discretion, and includes so few record citations 
and so minimal legal analysis that that her brief “expect[s] that opposing counsel 
or the court will do” her work for her. See A.S., 2017 UT 77, ¶ 16.  This Court 
should therefore strike her brief and award Wende her costs and fees incurred on 
behalf of the Estate in defending against it.  See supra Point I.   
In addition, on a finding that a brief is frivolous or for delay, this Court 
must award the prevailing party “just damages,” i.e. single or double costs and/or 
attorney fees.  A frivolous brief is “not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing 
law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing 
law.”  Utah R. App. P. 33(b).  An appeal filed for delay “is one interposed for any 
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improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of 
litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper.”  Id.   
Although Rule 33(b) sanctions are reserved for “egregious cases,” it is 
available in cases that are “obviously without any merit and has been taken with 
no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and results in delayed implementation of 
the judgment.” See Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988) (Rule 33 
sanctions appropriate where plaintiff’s repeated civil actions against defendant 
forced her to pay substantial costs and fees); Harris v. Harris, 2002 UT App 
401U (Rule 33 sanctions appropriate where “Husband has obfuscated and 
mischaracterized the issues in an attempt to mislead this court and provide 
legitimacy to his appeal.”); see also Porenta v. Porenta, 2017 UT 78, ¶ 54, 416 
P.3d 487  (nonfrivolous appeal “brought with the intention of hindering or 
delaying restoration of the property” at issue violated Rule 33).   
As stated above, Kathy’s brief is peppered with false and scandalous 
allegations against Wende, includes irrelevant material, and includes so little 
analysis that it is a challenge to respond to.  She has not made even a cursory 
showing that her arguments are “grounded in fact, … warranted by existing law, 
or … based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law.”  
See Utah R. App. P. 33(b).  She has “obfuscated and mischaracterized the issues 
in an attempt to mislead this court and provide legitimacy to [her] appeal.”  See 
Harris, 2002 UT App 401U.  
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For example, Kathy’s brief asserts that Wende breached her duty by taking 
out a loan to pay the State Street property taxes, when the trial court specifically 
found no breach, Br.Aplt. 40; R10818-23.  Kathy’s argument also ignores that the 
Estate simply had no liquid funds, that the Court ordered the loan, and that 
Wende had negotiated with the original lender.  R10824-826. Likewise, Kathy’s 
arguments entirely ignore the trial court’s ruling that her allegations were either 
released by the settlement or lacking in credibility.  R8384-385. Nor does she 
acknowledge that the trial court declined to revisit that ruling because the “long, 
repeated, venomous, angry, frustrated attacks, repeated attacks on the special 
administrator....  just haven't stood up to the analysis of the facts.”  R17525.    
Finally, this appeal is the culmination of eight years’ of persistent 
venomous attacks against Wende as special administrator that has resulted in 
over $440,000 in legal fees.  See, e.g., R418, R5285, R5464, R8140-142.  Kathy’s 
assertions related to other Hi-Country litigation, see Br.Aplt. 29, 36, and her 
various baseless allegations against Wende related to the court’s order, see 
Br.Aplt. 17-18, 23,  suggest that rather than seeking legitimate legal recourse, 
Kathy is improperly using this Court either to revisit rulings of other courts, or as 
an expensive means to delay the estate distribution and further harass Wende 
while other matters are decided.  Such an “improper purpose” has caused 
“needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the 
party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.”  See Utah R. App. P. 33(b); 
Porenta, 2017 UT 78, ¶ 54. 
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As a result, Kathy should be ordered to pay Wende her attorney fees and 
double costs incurred in defending this appeal on behalf of the Estate.  
B. Wende is entitled to her attorney fees under the probate code. 
Alternatively, Wende is entitled to her attorney fees by statute as special 
administrator.  See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719 (“If any personal representative or 
person nominated as personal representative defends or prosecutes any 
proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, the personal representative is 
entitled to receive from the estate all necessary expenses and disbursements, 
including reasonable attorney fees incurred.”).   “This court has interpreted 
attorney fee statutes broadly so as to award attorney fees on appeal where a 
statute initially authorizes them.”  Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 
(Utah 1998).  Additionally, “when a party who received attorney fees below 
prevails on appeal, ‘the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on 
appeal.’” Id. (quoting Utah Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 
(Utah App. 1991)). 
Here, the trial court awarded Wende her statutory attorney fees incurred 
fulfilling her role as special administrator from the Estate. R8391.   She is also 
entitled to her attorney fees on appeal, and a remand to determine an equitable 
distribution of fees. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, Wende, through counsel, respectfully asks the 
Court to affirm the trial court’s order closing the estate.  She also requests an 
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award of her attorney fees and double her costs on appeal.  Wende does not 
believe that oral argument would assist the Court in deciding this case.  
 
 Respectfully submitted on February 11, 2019. 
 
/s/ Deborah L. Bulkeley  
Counsel for Appellee  
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